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Taking Words For Granted:
Why Congress Should
Expressly Define Terms Within
the ESA's Takings Provision
by Douglas T. Cohen
When the government wants or
needs to take the private property of its
citizens through outright confiscation, or
ruinous regulation, it simply must pay for
these public benefits.'
Endangered and threatened species
"ore of aesthetic, ecological, educa-
tional, historical, recreational, and scien-
tific value to the Notion and its
people." 2
1. INTRODUCTION
Like the animals it was designed to
protect, for nearly four years the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) has been living
on borrowed time. On October 1,
1992, the eve of its twentieth anniver-
sary, authorization for spending under
the Act expired.' The 102nd Congress
found itself caught in the cross fire be-
tween environmentalists and advocates
of individual property rights over what
changes should be made to the ESA.
As a result, legislators failed to renew the
Act." Since 1992, Congress has contin-
ued to pass the political hot potato,
choosing each year to appropriate funds
for the Act without reauthorizing it. No
one doubts the Act eventually will be re-
authorized; the question is when and in
what form.
When the Clinton Administration took
office in 1992, it appeared as if the
political atmosphere in Washington
would breathe new life into the ESA.
Many assumed that Congress would re-
authorize the ESA without any significant
amendments.' Vice President Al Gore
had been in the forefront of the environ-
mental movement and the Clinton Ad-
ministration had strong environmental
allies in the democratically controlled
Congress. Property owners continued to
complain however, claiming the ESA
was interfering with their Fifth Amend-
ment rights against the taking of property
without just compensation.6 Using the
environmental/ property rights debate as
one of the pivotal points in their Contract
With America, the Republicans rode an
anti-government wave into Congress in
the 1994 elections, capturing the major-
ity in both Houses.! The mid-term elec-
tion ushered in a significant number of
property rights advocates who have
pushed for substantial changes to the
ESA before it is reauthorized.'
At the heart of the reauthorization de-
bate in Congress lies § 9, the ESA's
"takings" provision.9 Unlike other parts
of the Act, § .9 is enforceable against
both the federal government and private
I Kenneth B. MehIman et al., Debate, Taking "Takings" Rights Seriously: A Debate On Property Rights Legislation Before the 104th Congress, 9 ADMN. L.J.
AM. U. 253, 257 (1995) (hereinafter Debate, Taking "Takings" Seriously]. MehIman's comments were part of a recorded debate on the takings issue held at
American University. MehIman is an environmental lawyer and at the time of the debate was legislative director for Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas.
Others who took part in the debate include Thomas Sargentich, professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law at the Washington College of Law; Joseph
Sax, counselor to Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt; Roger Morzulla, an environmental lawyer and former assistant attorney general in charge of Land and
Natural Resources during the Reagan Administration; and Charles Tiefer, former deputy general counsel to the House of Representatives.
2 The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1531 (a)(3) (1988).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1542 (1988).
4 M. Lynne Corn, Endangered Species: Continuing Controversy, Cong. Res. Serv. Issue Brief, updated June 22, 1993, order code IB 93027.
5 See Larry Bradfish, Recent Developments in Listings Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act And Their Impact on Salmonids In The Northwest, 3
HAsrNGs W.N.W. J. Erwt. L. & Pot'Y 77 (1995) [hereinafter Comment, Recent Developments in Listings Decisions].
6 The property rights movement also has gained hold in state government. Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 20 state Legislatures passed new
property rights legislation. Jerome M. Organ, Understanding State and Federal Property Rights legislation, 48 OKL. L. REv. 191, 199 (1996). In addition,
more than 500 groups have formed nationwide to oppose the government's right to take or control private property. See, e.g., Carolyn Pesce, Private Property
vs. Public Rights, USA ToDAY, Feb. 6, 1995, at 3A.
7 Id.
a See Endangered Species: Push on For Reform of Act During Reauthorization, [ 1995] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at * I Uan. 9, 1995), available in
WESTIAW BNA-DEN [hereinafter Doily Reporter: Push On For Reform]. The article discusses H.R. 1490, a bill introduced in the 103rd Congress by Rep.
Billy Touzin (D-La.) that calls for compensating private property owners when they are "substantially deprived of the economically viable use of the property due
to ESA restrictions."
In addition, the article discusses how Rep. Don Young (R-Alaskal, the then-incoming House Resources Committee Chairman, supports an amended ESA that
would make it easier to delist a species and make it more difficult to list "locally" endangered species such as Salmon of the Columbia and Snake Rivers that
are in abundance in other states. Id.
9 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
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parties. The provision prohibits anyone
from "taking" a species listed as endan-
gered.io Under the current version of the
ESA, individuals are held criminally and
civilly liable for the "taking" of an endan-
gered species." The ESA, however, left
it in the hands of the Secretary of the In-
terior and the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) 2 to define what constitutes a
"taking," including the definition of the
term "harm." 13  The fact that the ESA
did not expressly define these terms has
served to fuel the fire between environ-
mentalists and property rights advocates
over the intended and proper scope of
the takings provision.
This argument culminated in the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Bab-
bitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Commu-
nities for a Greater Oregon, 14 in which
the Court affirmed the broad, regulatory
definition of a "taking" which encom-
passed indirect harm to species as a re-
sult of habitat modification.
Some environmentalists have pro-
posed a broader, ecosystem-based ap-
proach to protecting wildlife. Generally,
they favor a definition of "takings" that
includes indirect as well as direct harm
to species. Environmentalists argue that
private property development and modifi-
cation is more lethal to wildlife than any
direct human threat.15 However, based
on the perspective that human welfare
should come before the welfare of
"lesser" species, property rights advo-
cates call for a much narrower approach
to the takings provision.' 6 They want the
ESA to be amended so that parties are
held responsible for violations of the
"takings" provision only if their activities,
such as hunting and fishing, pose a di-
rect harm to protected species."
This comment will argue that the
courts should not be left to legislate the
proper balancing test between ecosys-
tems and economic property rights or
make case-by-case determinations of
whether the government has "gone too
far."" In light of the Act's overarching
purpose of comprehensive protection at
any cost for species at risk,' 9 when it re-
authorizes the Act, Congress should ex-
pressly define the scope of the "takings"
provision in a manner that reflects the
ESA's broad intent. 20
The comment will conclude that Con-
gress must take it upon itself to better de-
fine the parameters of the takings
provision and establish the factors the
Secretary of the Interior and the courts
must consider in deciding whether spe-
cific activity constitutes an illegal taking
under the ESA.
II. LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Takings Under the Original and
Amended ESA
Although many issues have arisen
during the ESA's twenty years of exis-
tence, in recent years much of the reau-
thorization debate has centered on what
constitutes a "taking" under § 9.2' The
Departments of Interior and Commerce
implement § 9 of the Act. The Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for
terrestrial species and the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for marine
22species. Most of the debate over the
takings issue concerns FWS regulations
because the vast majority of complaints
about the ESA's takings provision are
brought by land developers and owners.
The ESA defines "endangered spe-
cies" as "any species which is in danger
of extinction throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range."2 1 It defines
"threatened species" as any species
which is likely to become an endan-
gered species in the near future. 24 The
10 Id.
1i 16 U.S.C. § 1540(oaHb) (1988).
12 The regulatory definitions for these terms are found at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
13 16 U.S.C. §1531-44 (1988).
'4 115 S.CI. 2407 (1995).
Is See Robert Meltz, Where The Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 24 Erv. L. 369 (1994) [hereinafter Comment, Where
The Wild Things Are]. See also, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
16 Laura Sptizberg, Comment, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act, 13 TEMP. Evrwr. L. & TECH. J. 193 (1994) (citing Bruce Fein & Edwin
Meese 1il, Endangered a Species of Our Own: The Act Should be Amended so Human Welfare Comes First, L.A. TMES, Mon. July 30, 1990 at B7)
[hereinafter Comment, Reauthorization of the ESA].
i'7 See, e.g., H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. § 202 (1995).
i" Debate, Taking "Takings" Rights Seriously, supro note 1, at 253 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) in which the
Court held that "[tihe g neral rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."). See also John Delaney, What Does It Take to Make a Take? A Post-Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence in the Supreme
Court, 27 URB. LAw. 55 (1995).
1' 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) 11988); See, e.g., NA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 11978).
20 See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978), in which the Court stated that [t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute
was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every
section of the statute."
21 Debate, Taking "Takings" Rights Seriously, supro note 1, at 253.
22 Ray Vaughn, State of Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart Protection For Rare
Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569, 571 (1995) (quoting UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS CouLD ENHANCE
RECOVERY PROGRAM 12 (Dec. 1988), which states "[I]nterior is responsible for freshwater and land species. Commerce for sea and ocean (marine) species.")
(hereinafter Comment, Opponents Thwart Protection].
23 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988).
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takings provision prohibits anyone from
taking a species that is listed as endan-
gered.25 The ESA states that "to take"
means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or col-
lect, or attempt to engage in any such
conduct."26  At least one commentator
has praised the clarity of the § 9 takings
provision, stating it is "simple, unambigu-
ous, and breathtaking in its reach and
power."27 Although § 9 does not make
it unlawful to take a threatened species,
such as the Northern spotted owl, the
FWS promulgated a regulation that af-
fords threaten species the same protec-
tion the Act affords to endangered
species. 28
The FWS has been called upon to
do much more than just bring threatened
species within the parameters of the stat-
ute's protection. Because the ESA also
fails to define what it means to "harm"
or "harass" any listed species, definitions
integral to determining whether an illegal
taking has occurred,29 the FWS has
had to take up the slack. Thus, the pre-
sent version of the ESA has created fer-
tile ground for the battle between
environmentalists and the pro-property
lobby over whether the government has
gone too far in setting the parameters of
the takings provision. The counselor to
the Secretary of the Interior, himself, has
stated that anytime legislation leaves it
up to the Secretary to decide how far
regulations should go, the politics of the
day will dictate the scope of that
regulation. 30
The definition of "harm" promulgated
by the FWS covers any "act which actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife," including
indirect harm to species resulting from
significant habitat3' modification or deg-
radation where wildlife is actually killed
or injured by significantly impairing es-
sential behavior patterns, including
breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 2 The
FWS has defined "harass" as "an
intentional or negligent act or omission
which creates the likelihood of injury to
wildlife by annoying it to such an extent
so as to significantly disrupt normal be-
havior patterns, including, but not limited
to, breeding, feeding or sheltering."3
Proponents of property rights have
attacked the FWS definitions on two ma-
jor fronts. First, they have argued that
the FWS definitions are overly broad34
and violate their Fifth Amendment rights
against the arbitrary exercise of power
by the government.35  Second, they
claim that the Act can have an irreversi-
ble, debilitating impact on local and
state economies.36
B. Legal History: A Conflict In
Case Law
Since the passage of the ESA in
1973, courts generally have interpreted
the takings provision and other sections
of the ESA as comprehensive legislation
for the preservation of endangered
24 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1988).
25 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19)(1988).
26 Id.
2 Comment, The Reauthorization of The ESA, supro note 16.
2 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a). At least one commentator has argued that the § 9 takings provision covers threatened species based on the fact that its
prohibitions apply to "any regulation pertaining.. to any threatened species of fish or wildlife" that has been listed pursuant to § 4 and promulgated by the
Secretary. See, e.g., Comment, Opponents Thwart Protection, supro note 22.
29 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1988).
3o Debate, Taking "Takings" Rights Seriously, supro note 1, at 265-66. Proposed legislation to narrow the scope of takings does not solve the problem of
creating an endless debate:
I can tell you when Bruce Babbitt, as the Secretary of the Interior, has to reduce some regulation, he is going to reduce different regulation than
would be reduced by James Watt, were he Secretary of the Interior. I cannot imagine why the Congress would want to create a situation where
agencies would address the particular programs that are supposed to be the subject of excess regulation, and then decide whether and to what ex-
tent those programs ought to be modified. Id.
See also supro note 18 and accompanying text.
31 As part of the listing of a species as endangered or threatened, a determination of that species critical habitat also is left to the Departments of Interior and
Commerce.
A critical habitat consists of specific areas worthy of protection because the habitat contains physical and biological features necessary for survival of a
listed species. As a result, critical habitats may include areas that the listed species is not occupying at the time and may exclude terrain that the species can
be found in but is not critical to its survival.
In addition to those guidelines, however, the ESA states the Departments of Interior and Commerce must take into account economic impact of designating
areas critical habitats and publish a regulation concerning the critical habitat along with the regulation concerning the listing of the species as endangered or
threatened.
32 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1989).
3 Id.
' One commentator has noted that the FWS definition of harm is narrower than the meaning the courts had attached to it. See John Charles Kunich, The
Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 Envtl. L. 501, 549 (1994) (citing Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land Resources, 471
F.Supp. 985 (D. How. 1979), off'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) in which the court held that the state was taking Palila birds in violation of § 9, based
on a showing only that the Polila was almost extinct and that grazing was destroying the plant life the birds needed to survive). After Polilo, the FWS narrowed
its definition of harm, clarifying that adverse habitat modification must be shown. Id.
3s Debate. Taking "Takings" Seriously, supro note 1, at 257-58.
36 Comment, Opponents Thwart Protection, supra note 22, at 579 (citing Satterfield et al., Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Mouse?, NAT. RESouRCES & ENv'T 13
(1993); William P. Pendley, Real World Impact of Endangered Species Act Reads Like Science Fiction Thriller, PicK & SHOVEI, JOn. 1993, at 17, 211.
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species.37 In coming to that consensus,
however, courts continually have wres-
tIed with the Fifth Amendment rights of
individual property owners and the role
indirect harm plays in the preservation of
wildlife.3
Three cases out of the Ninth, Fifth
and D.C. circuits reveal how the courts
have struggled to define the scope of the
takings provision in § 9. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Polila v. Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources, was the
first appellate court to tackle this issue."
In Polilo 1, goats and sheep were de-
stroying plant life essential to the survival
of the Palila bird by grazing on the
Mamane-Naio forest.40 The federal gov-
ernment had listed the bird, a finch-billed
member of the Hawaiian Honey-
creeper,41 as an endangered species in
1967. However, its habitat was not
designated as critical for another ten
years.i The district court in Palila I
found that the grazing was causing a
"relentless decline of the Palila's habitat"
by foraging its food, shelter and nesting
area.4 ' This, the court determined,
amounted to a taking under § 9 of the
ESA.
Developers and landowners, con-
cerned that modification to a critical
habitat without any showing of actual
death or injury would now constitute an
illegal taking under § 9, lobbied the De-
partment of the Interior to reexamine its
definition of harm." The holding in
Polila I caused the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to propose a narrower definition of
"harm" that limited it to "an act or omis-
sion which kills or injures wildlife."46 En-
vironmentalists immediately criticized the
proposal as contrary to the intent of the
ESA, forcing the Secretary of the Interior
to back track.47
In 198 1, the Department of the Inte-
rior clarified its position. A statement re-
leased by the FWS declared that "harm"
would not be limited "to direct physical
injury to an individual member of the
wildlife species."48 The statement further
recognized the importance of including
indirect damage to species in the defini-
tion of a "taking," adding that death or
injury as defined in the proposal after
Palila "may be caused by impairment of
essential behavioral patterns which can
have significant and permanent effects
on a listed species." 49
In its original form, § 9 had prohib-
ited any taking whatsoever of any listed
species. In the wake of Palila 1, how-
ever, the pro-property movement con-
vinced Congress in 1982 to amend the
ESA, allowing the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to issue federal exemptions and
"incidental take permits" under §§ 7
and 10.50 Under the first, § 7 exemp-
tion, if a federal agency authorizes,
funds, or approves a project, the land
owner can receive protection against
any ESA takings prohibitions. The federal
agency that takes responsibility for the
project must, within a 90-day frame-
work, consult with the Secretary of the
Interior or Commerce to ensure that the
action will not jeopardize the continued
existence of an endangered or threat-
ened species."
To qualify for the other exemption un-
der § 10, applicants must submit a con-
servation plan that outlines how
development or land use will benefit an
endangered species.52 The plan, which
requires approval by the Department of
the Interior, must specify the expected
impact on the species and the means the
property owner will use to minimize and
mitigate the damage.5 ' The plan also
must identify alternatives and explain
why they should not be implemented.
The exemption is tailored specifically to
encompass incidental takings by state
agencies and private property owners.
The 1982 amendments to the ESA
were a precursor to the present day de-
bate over what changes should be made
to takings provisions of the ESA before its
reauthorization. § 10 deals with
"incidental" takings, which by their
" See iVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter Of
Communities For A Great Oregon, 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995).
" Id.; See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
3 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
40 Polila 1, 471 F.Supp. 985, 990 (D.How. 1979).
4 Craig Robert Baldauf, Comment, Searching for a Place to Coll Home: Courts, Congress, and Common Killers Conspire to Drive An Endangered Species
Into Extinction, 30 WAr FOREST L. REv. 847, 859 (19951 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1994)) [hereinafter Comment, Killers Conspire].
42 Polilo 1, 639 F.2d at 496. The state of Hawaii had kept flocks of sheep and goats on a game preserve and allowed the animals to roam along the
slopes of the Mauna Kea in the Mamane-Halo forest. The Polila's habitat was within the grazing area. Id.
4 471 F.Supp at 990.
4 639 F.2d at 497.
4 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (1981); See also, Comment, Where The Wild Things Are, supro note 15, at 380.
48Id.
SId. at 380.
48 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (19811.
4 Id.
50 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b) (1988).
si Id. § 1536(a)(2).
52 Id § 1536(h).
5 Id.
s4 Id.
55 Id. § 1539(a).
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nature involve indirect harm to species
through the destruction or degradation of
their habitat. § 10(a)(1)(b), amended in
1982, gives the Secretary of the Interior
the power to issue permits to allow cer-
tain "takings" that are "incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of
otherwise lawful activity."56 Actions that
constitute a direct taking are clearly de-
fined under the ESA. The vast majority
of problematic cases stem from indirect
takings, those that adversely affect a spe-
cies by depriving it of its critical habitat
or sustenance.5 1 Unlike § 7, the § 9
takings provision does not expressly pro-
hibit indirect harm to species caused by
the destruction of, or damage to, their
habitat. As a result, courts have taken it
upon themselves to interpret the lan-
guage in § 10(a)(1)(b) of the ESA as a
sign from Congress that it intended the
Act to cover both indirect and direct
takings.
The Palila bird landed back in the
Ninth Circuit in 1986," this time on the
shoulders of the Sierra Club. The envi-
ronmental group alleged that the state of
Hawaii was allowing mouflon sheep,
which it had maintained for recreational
hunting, to feed on the Mamane plant.W
The Palila relied on the Mamane seeds
and pods for food.6 ' The Hawaii's
Department of Land and Natural Re-
sources, attempting to rely on the new
definition of harm promulgated by the
FWS, argued that the Sierra Club had
failed to show any actual death or injury
to the birds.62
The district court rejected the state's
argument, holding that:
[s]ignificant habitat degradation
is actually presently injuring the
Palila by decreasing food and
nesting sites, so that the Palila
population is suppressed to its
currently critical endangered
levels.
The district court further stated that:
[i]f the habitat modification pre-
vents the population from recov-
ering, then this causes injury to
the species and should be ac-
tionable under section 9.4
Affirming the District Court's ruling,6 s
the Ninth Circuit rejected the state's ar-
gument and focused on the actual as
well as potential injury to the species as
a whole." The Ninth Circuit determined
from the legislative history of the ESA that
Congress intended the term "taking" to
be all encompassing in order to provide
proper protection for endangered spe-
cies such as the Palila. 6' One crucial
issue the Ninth Circuit failed to address,
however, was whether habitat destruc-
tion that slowed the recovery of a listed
species also would constitute an illegal
taking.6
In the past two years, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has refined the definition of "harm" it
established in Polilo. In National Wild-
life Federation v. Burlington Northern
Railroad, the court held that for a
plaintiff to show that a harmful act ran
afoul of § 9 it would have to show
"significant habitat modification or deg-
radation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essen-
tial behavior patterns, including breed-
ing, feeding or sheltering." 70
A year later, however, in Forest Park
v. Rosboro Lumber Co., i the court held
that a listed species need not be threat-
ened with extinction for harm to be con-
sidered a taking under § 9 and that
imminent, as opposed to actual harm,
was enough to trigger an illegal tak-
ing.72 At approximately the same time,
the Fifth Circuit also found itself in the
middle of the ESA fray. In Sierra Club v.
Lyng,73 the environmental group sought
an injunction against the Secretary of
Agriculture and the chief of the forest
service to halt the cutting of pine trees in
the southeastern United States.74  The
forest service was cutting certain trees to
" Id. See generally. Donald E. Soderberg & Paul E. Larsen, Triggering Section 7: Federal Land Soles and "Incidental Take" Permits, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVR. L
169, 177-80 (1991).
' See Comment, Recent Developments in Listing Decisions, supro note 5, at 83.
s 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988); See Palio v. Hawaii Dept. of Land Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
s9 Polilo 11, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
6 Id. at 1109.
61 Id.
62 Id.
' 649 F.Supp 1070.
" Id. at 1077.
6 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 19th Cir. 1988). See also, Comment, Killers Conspire, supro note 41, at 860 (citing Polilo Il and TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978) for the proposition that Congress intended that the ESA apply to ecosystems upon which endangered species rely because habitat degradation poses
more of a threat than direct killings).
66 852 F.2dat 1 108.
' Id. Iciting S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. §7 (1993), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995 which stated "take" was to be defined in
the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person could take or attempt to take any fish or wildlife.)
6 Id. at 1110.
6 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994).
7 Id. at 1511.
7 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995).
72 Id.
' 694 F.Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 19881, off'd in part, reversed in part, remanded sub nom., Sierra Club v. Yuetter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 19911.
74 Id.
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combat the spread of the southern pine
beetle and also to maintain the Texas
timber industry.7' However, the man-
agement plan was having an adverse
impact on the red-cockaded wood-
pecker, which nests in old pine trees and
feeds on small fruits and seeds on the
tree itself as opposed to foraging the
ground.' From 1982 to 1987, the
population of the woodpecker had de-
clined more than 40 percent in several
National Forests in Texas." In its find-
ing of facts, the court noted that if no
changes were made to the forest man-
agement plan, the bird would be extinct
by the year 1995.'
As a result, the court held that the For-
est Service's timber management prac-
tices were in violation of § 9 because
the cuffing of old-growth pines was sys-
tematically destroying the red-
cockaded's habitat.79 In its ruling, the
court noted that the "goals and objec-
tives of timber harvesting and protection
of endangered species in some situations
are at odds with one another.",80 How-
ever, it added that:
It is uncontested that a severe
decline in the population of
woodpeckers has occurred in
the past ten years. "Harm"
does not necessarily require
proof of the death of specific or
individual members of spe-
cies.ai
1I. BABBITT V. SWEET HOME PAVES
THE WAY
Until the summer of 1995, the Lyng
and Polila decisions in the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits defined what courts con-
sidered to be the proper scope of the
word "harm". Then came the U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities For a
Great Oregon.8 2
As the Ninth Circuit looked on, its
broad definition of "harm" in Polila
came under attack in the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals. In Sweet
Home 1,83 several non-profit citizens'
groups banded together with Northwest
lumber businesses to challenge the FWS
regulation that had defined "harm" as it
applied to § 9 of the ESA."
In this case, the controversy stemmed
from the fact that the FWS's definition of
"harm" as applied to the red-cockaded
woodpecker" and northern spotted
owl"6 was resulting in economic hard-
ship for families dependent on the log-
ging industry.87 The plaintiffs contended
that the regulation's inclusion of "habitat
modification" within the meaning of
"harm" violated the ESA." In the alter-
native, they argued that the regulation
was vague as to the types of habitat
modification prohibited. 9
At first, a divided panel of the Court
of Appeals upheld the FWS's definition
of "harm," finding it lawfully included the
mere modification of a habitat of an en-
dangered or threatened species." Prop-
erty rights plaintiffs persisted, however,
and the following year were granted a
rehearing." In Sweet Home 11, the Sec-
retary of the Interior argued that the ESA
was created in 1973 based on the reali-
zation that species whose numbers and
habitats had been depleted needed pro-
tection from a wide range of acts that
threatened their existence.92 In the alter-
native, the Secretary argued that the
7s Id. at 1264.
'7 Id. at 1265. The court noted that the forestry management plan called for the cutting down of trees after they reached a maximum age of 60 to 80 years,
a policy highly detrimental to the woodpecker since it thrived on older trees. Id.
" Id. at 1266.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1 27 1.
'0Id. at 1269.
" Id. at 1270 (citing Polilo 11649 F. Supp. at 1076-77). The court further noted that the four factors cited in the FWS regulations that defined "harm" were
present in the forest service management practices:
I lIThe cutting of specified pines had created "islands" of older growth trees that isolated woodpecker colonies.
(2) isolation of those colonies interfered with breeding practices, contributing to population decline, reduction in the gene pool and genetic
problems.
(3) The management plan was hindering the woodpecker's recovery by making it difficult for the birds to find nourishment since they did not feed
on the ground.
(4) The cutting of certain trees was endangering the livelihood of older trees in which woodpeckers carved their cavities and placed their nests.
Id. at 1271-72.
82 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995).
83 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), modified, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct. 714, rev'd, 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995).
14 Id. at 2.
s 115 S.Ct. at 2410 (citing 50 CFR § 17 I(h)(1 994) and the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 275). The Conservation Act,
which was the ESA's predecessor, listed the red'cockaded woodpecker as one of the first endangered species in 1970.
'6 Id of rp.4 (iting 55 Fed. Reg. 26114 (19901, which brought threatened species within the parameters of § 9 takings).
87 Id. at 2410.
88 1 F.3d at 2.
89 Id.
9 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
9' Sweet Home v. Babbitt, 17 F. 3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995) [hereinafter Sweet Home 1l].
9 Id. at 1464.
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1982 amendment to the ESA, which
provided several exemptions for develop-
ers who filed approved habitat conserva-
tion plans (HCP's),9 ' was evidence of
the fact that the ESA, despite the ab-
sence of specific wording to the effect,
contained built-in protections against de-
struction of a species habitat. Otherwise,
the government argued, Congress would
not have needed to enact an amend-
ment that carved out such an
exception.9
This time, the plaintiffs convinced one
judge to switch sides and tip the scales
in their favor.9 5 The court rejected both
of the government's arguments, holding
that the FWS' definition of harm went
beyond the scope of the ESA by restrict-
ing various types of habitat modifica-
tion.96 The court simply refused to be
bound by the secretary's interpretation of
the legislative history and the political
climate that lead to the passage of the
ESA. Instead, the court adopted its own
interpretation of the legislative history,
stating that Congress could not have in-
tended "harm" to be so broadly defined
without due regard for the impact on pri-
vate property rights.97 The court pointed
to the fact that the term "habitat modifi-
cation" was conspicuously absent from
the final version of the ESA bill that
passed both Houses. In comparison, an
earlier Senate version of the bill" had
included, within a listing of prohibited
takings, a provision on habitat modifica-
tion.' The Sweet Home 11 ruling was in
direct conflict with Palila II, which had
held that the ESA's definition of "takings"
included habitat modification.1"
The Court of Appeals in Sweet Home
11 bolstered its opinion by applying a rule
of statutory construction called noscitur a
sociis. The maxim stands for the propo-
sition that a word's meaning, if unclear,
must be based on its association with
surrounding words in a statute.10' Ac-
cording to the court, the word "harm" as
used in § 9 must be narrowly interpreted
as a direct action verb because it is
accompanied by direct words such as
"take." 10 2 In support of applying nosci-
tur a sociis, the court referred to a Ninth
Circuit decision that had narrowly inter-
preted the word "harass" in the Marine
Mammal Protection Act. 0 3
Environmentalists, feeling 20 years of
progress under the ESA slipping away,
immediately attacked the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Sweet Home /l.' The Court of
Appeals denied the Secretary's petition
for rehearing and suggestion for rehear-
ing en banc.'o In early 1995, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the split in the circuits over the
proper definition of "harm" as it applied
to the § 9 takings provision."o The rele-
vant question presented for review was
whether the Secretary of the Interior ex-
ceeded his authority by promulgating a
regulation that defines the ESA's prohibi-
tion on takings to include "significant
habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures
wildlife."' 07
9 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1988).
* Sweet Home 11, 17 F.3d at 1464.
* The vote had been 2-1 in Sweet Home I. Since the appellate court consists of a three-judge panel, a change of position by one of the two judges in the
majority was enough to reverse the ruling.
96 17 F.3d at 1472-73.
Id. at 1465. The court stated that:
The implications of the [FWS'] definition suggest its improbable relation to congressional intent. Species dependency may be very broad. One ad-
herent of aggressive protection, for instance, notes that (slome scientists believe as many as 35 million to 42 million acres of land are necessary to
the survival of the grizzlies, about as much land in the northern Rockies of the United States and Canada as is still usable grizzly habitat.
9 Id. at 1467.
w Id. The court stated "we are mindful of the fact that Congress had before it, but failed to pass, just such a scheme." Id.
'0 Polila II, 852 F.2d at 1108; See supro note 59 and accompanying text.
1'0 BLACK'S LAW DicToIARY, 1060 (6th Ed. 1990): literally, "it is known from its associates." In statutes, the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or
phrases may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words that accompany it.
'0 Sweet Home ||, 17 F.3d at 1465. The court stated as follows:
[t]he words of the definition contemplate the perpetrator's direct application of force against the animal taken: "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." The forbidden acts fit, in ordinary language, the basic model "A hit B"...(t]he nine verbs accompanying
"harm" all involve a substantially direct application of force, which the Service's concept of forbidden habitat modification altogether lacks.
In a harbinger of what was to come when the Supreme Court reviewed the case, Judge Mikvo in his dissent stated that harm could have many different
meanings along with the other so-called unambiguous direct action words in § 9 cited by the majority. Id. at 1475.
103 17 F.3d at 1464 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A)); United States v. Hayashi, S F.3d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993).
10 Comment, Killers Conspire, supro note 41, at 863 (citing Supreme Court Wrap-up, THE RECORDER, Jan. 9, 1995, at 5).
10 Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. C. 714, rev'd, 115 S. Ct.
2407 (1995). In denying his petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals chided Babbitt for advancing "ill-founded critiques of the panel opinion." Id. at
191.
"i Endangered Species: Supreme Court Grants Review to Ruling Limiting Definition of Harm, ( 1995] DARy ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 5 at 1-2, Jan. 9, 1995,
available in Westlaw BNA-DEN (hereinafter Endangered Species].
'07 115 S.Ct. 2407, 2409 (1995); See also, Comment, Killers Conspire, supro note 41, at 864 (quoting Supreme Court Proceedings, Summary of Cases
Granted Review, U.S.L.W. (BNA) * 15, Jan. 10, 1995, available in WEST[AW USLWDI. Question was whether "[t]he regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior in 1975 and 1981 that defines 'harm' as used in the Endangered Species Act, and includes 'significant habitat modification or
degradation' that 'actually kills or injures wildlife,' 50 C.F.R. 17.3, [is] valid on its face?" Id.
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In a four-part decision that environ-
mentalists heralded as a turning of the
tide against the property rights move-
ment, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals.'os First, the Court
took a no-nonsense, down-to-Earth ap-
proach to the long standing debate over
the scope of the term "harm" as it ap-
plies to § 9: it looked the word up in the
dictionary.'0 The court found that harm
meant to "cause hurt or damage to: in-
jure."o10 Writing for the 6-3 majority,
Justice Stevens stated that the common
definition of harm in the context of the
ESA "naturally encompasses habitat
modification that results in actual injury or
death to members of an endangered or
threatened species.""' Stevens noted
that the dictionary made no mention of
injury having to be "direct" or "willful" in
order to constitute harm."' Advancing
a new argument not discussed by the
lower courts, the majority added that if
the word "harm" within § 9 was limited
to direct injury, then it would serve to du-
plicate the meaning of other words the
ESA used in § 3 to define the scope of
the word "take."'13
In a footnote to the opinion, the ma-
jority even took the opportunity to deride
the respondent for attempting to argue
that a "taking" can only apply to the ex-
ercise of dominion over a creature." 4
"This limitation," the court stated, "ill
serves the statutory text, which forbids
not taking 'some creature' but tak(ing]
any [endangered] species - a formida-
ble task for even the most rapacious feu-
dal lord.""-'
Justice Stevens expounded upon past
decisions which had held that the over-
arching purpose of the ESA supported a
broad interpretation of the underlying
terms in the § 9 takings provision.' 6 Ex-
cept in regard to federal lands, the En-
dangered Species Conservation Act, the
ESA's predecessor, did not contain the
sweeping prohibitions included in the
1973 Act."' The Court pointed to lan-
guage at the beginning of the ESA
which clearly states the Act applies to
ecosystems, not just direct harm to indi-
vidual members of an endangered spe-
cies. ii
In effect, Justice Stevens relied on rea-
soning the Court had applied in the
1978 landmark decision in TVA v. Hill,
where it enjoined the building of a dam
that was damaging the critical habitat of
the snail darter.' 9 Although the ruling in
TVA concerned § 7 of the Act, Stevens
noted the Court had recognized that the
plain intent of halting species extinction
"whatever the cost" was "reflected in
every section of the statute."120 Further-
more, TVA specifically referred to the
Secretary's definition of "harm" within
the § 9 taking provision in reasoning
that it could not understand how opera-
tion of the dam would not "harm" the
snail darter.121
The Court went on to state that ex-
emptions created by Congress in 1982
for certain "incidental" takings were a
clear sign that the ESA, as enacted in
1973, applied to indirect as well as de-
liberate takings.122 As discussed earlier,
the 1982 amendment to the ESA author-
ized the secretaries of the Interior and
Commerce to issue permits for takings
that otherwise would be prohibited under
§ 9(a)(1)(B) if the takings were ancillary
to and not the sole purpose of lawful ac-
tivity.123 In effect, the Court stated, the
narrow interpretation of "harm" proffered
by Sweet Home would lead to the ab-
surd result that the only ones applying for
an incidental tokirgs permit would be
persons who feared running afoul of § 9
because they intended to directly harm
an endangered species.124
In short, the Court was saying it
made no sense for Congress to create
an exemption for indirect harm if the ESA
prohibited only direct harm, even though
Sweet Home had convinced the Court of
Appeals to adopt its narrow definition of
harm. Justice Stevens pointed out three
major flaws in the lower court's analysis.
108 Id. at 2418.
'0 Id. at 2412-13.
10 ld.(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATK)NAL DEcTIONARY 1034 (1966)).
"I Id. at 2412-13.
112 Id. at 2413.
" Id. (citing Mackey v. lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 [198&11, for the proposition that statutory terms each have independent
significance and should not be interpreted as mere surplusage).
"I Id. at 2413, n-10 [citing respondent's brief 19 at 2422-23).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2413.
117 Id. at 2413 (citing TVA v. Hill', 437 US_ 153, 180 (1978)). The Court in TVA described the ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." In that case, the Court enjoined the Tennessee Valley Authority from completing a dam
because its operation would have either eradicated the population of the snail tarter or destroyed its critical habitat. The Court issued the injunction despite the
fact the dam was near completion. 437 U.S. at 153.
" Id. (citing § 2 of the Act which states that its purpose is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved."). See 16 U S.C. § 1531 (b).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2413 (citing 437 U.S. at 184).
121 437 U.S. at 184-85.
122 Sweet Home 11, 115 S.Ct. at 2414.
123 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1988).
124 Sweet Home II, 115 S.Ct. at 2414.
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First, he stated that several words in the
definition section of the Act often referred
to indirect as well as direct action.' 25 In
a related argument, Justice Stevens held
that the Court of Appeals had misap-
plied the maxim of noscitur a sociis,
which stands for the proposition that a
word redefines itself within changing
contexts, but still retains its own distinct
meaning from accompanying terms. 126
The Court of Appeals also erred by mis-
interpreting § 9 to require a higher stan-
dard of intent such as purposeful action,
despite the fact the ESA had been modi-
fied127 to state that an illegal taking
could occur if the violator "knowingly"
committed the harm.' 2 8
The Court rejected Sweet Home's
argument that, given the FWS's broad
interpretation of "harm" in the takings
provision, the government lacked any
incentive to purchase land under § 5 or
avoid destruction of habitats under §
7.129 That argument, according to the
Court, ignored several practical consid-
erations. For one, buying private land to
protect species may be much less costly
than chasing down violators and issuing
fines under § 9."0 In addition, § 5 is
proactive in that it enables the
government to purchase land before a
species suffers any actual harm or before
its critical habitat is modified in a way
that could result in future harm.' 3'
Justice Stevens further held that Sweet
Home's argument failed to address some
crucial distinctions between § 7 and §
9.132 Most importantly, § 7 applies only
to federal action while the § 9 takings
provision applies to "any person." In
addition, § 7 applies only to actions
"likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of an endangered species," which
holds the government to a higher burden
of proof than the language in the § 9
takings provision. 134
Finally, the Court held that the legisla-
tive history of the ESA supported the Sec-
retary of the Interior's definition of
"harm" within FWS regulations. While
committee reports prior to the ESA's pas-
sage did not refer specifically to "harm,"
they did stress that the word "taking"
should be interpreted to mean "any con-
ceivable way" a person could injure or
kill wildlife.'35 In addition, the Court
noted that a Senator introduced a floor
amendment specifically to include the
word "harm" within the defining terms of
the § 9 takings provision, solid proof
that the word plays a distinct and crucial
role in the ESA and is worthy of a broad
interpretation.' 36
In a somewhat specious argument,
Justice Stevens dismissed Sweet Home's
claim that this supported a narrow inter-
pretation of "taking." Sweet Home also
advanced the argument that a Senate
version of the ESA contained a broad
definition of "take" that included the de-
struction, modification, or curtailment of
a critical habitat but lawmakers removed
that definition before sending the bill to
the floor.' 31 Using the leeway inherent
in interpretation of legislative history, Ste-
vens claimed there was no indication
why the Senate removed that broad lan-
guage.13 1 In a stronger point, Stevens
added that the actual language in the
1973 committee bill was much broader
than the present FWS regulation.' 39 Ste-
vens used this distinction to label the pre-
sent FWS definition of "harm" as a
moderate form of habitat protection.
125 Id. at 2414-15 (referring to the words "harass," "pursue," "wound," and even "kill" that accompany "harm" in § 3 of the ESA).
126 Id. (citing Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923)). The Court stated specifically that the Secretary's interpretation of "harm"
to include indirect injury to species through habitat modification enables the word to have "a character of its own not to be submerged by its association." Id.
" See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804, p. 26 (1978) in which Congress replaced "willfully" with the term "knowingly," which requires a lower level of intent.
The purpose of the change was to make criminal violations of the ESA a general as opposed to specific intent crime. As stated by the Court, Sweet Home
never argued why the ESA or the FWS' "harm" definition should not be read to incorporateordinary standards of proximate cause and foreseeability. Sweet
Home 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2413, n.9. In other words, a person can commit an illegal taking not ony if he acts with a specific purpose but if he should have
known or reasonably could foresee that the resulting harm would occur.
28 Id.
'29 Id. at 2415.
120 Id.
131 Id. In a later footnote, the majority also stated that, contrary to Sweet Home's contention, the legislative history of the ESA does not suggest that § 5 would
be the Act's exclusive remedy for habitat modification by private landowners. Id. at 2416, n. 19.
132 Id.
133 Id.
'" Id. The Court found support for its argument in an amendment Congress made to the ESA in 1978 which distinguished between §§ 7 and 9. The
amendment, made in the wake of the Court's ruling in TVA v. Hill, added § 7(o), which provides that any federal project subject to exemption from § 7 also is
exempt from § 9. Id. at 2416 (citing 16 U.S.C. 1536(o)).
us Id. at 2416 (citing S.Rep. No. 93-307, p. 7 (1973)). The House report used similar language, and further referred to intentional and unintentional
harassment as an illegitimate taking. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 15 (1973). The Court referred to a specific example of indirect harm mentioned in the
House bill. The example said bird watchers who caused a disturbance and upset the birds egg laying could be subject to ESA regulations. Sweet Home 11,
115 S.t. at 2416.
136 Id. at 2416-17 (citing 119 Cong.Rec. 25683 (uly 24, 1973).
1 Id. at 2417.
138 Id.
13 Id. The wording of Senate Bill 1983 would have caused any habitat modification to be considered a violation of the ESA because it did not include the
provision that the modification must result in the death or injury of wildlife. Under the bill, any modification, not just those that were significant, would also have
been a violation.
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The Court garnered further support for
its holding by looking to the legislative
history behind the 1982 amendment that
enabled land owners to apply for inci-
dental taking permits. 140 Sweet Home
had argued that Congress intended for
the amendment to cover accidental as
opposed to purposeful killings of listed
species. The House Report, however,
contained language almost identical to
the wording in the present version of the
ESA, which distinguishes between tak-
ings that are "incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the activity."1 1  The Court
noted that Congress obviously intended
to cover situations beyond hunting and
fishing because it used as an example a
construction project that would alter the
habitat of an endangered butterfly.142
In his conclusion, Justice Stevens
made the observation that the proper in-
terpretation of "harm" within the broad
confines of the ESA involved a complex
policy choice that should be left to the
discretion of the Secretary of the Interior,
not the courts.' 4 3 He went on, however,
to state that enforcement of the ESA
raises difficult questions of "proximity
and degree" involving economic and
social values that must be addressed on
a case-by-case basis.' 44 In the end, the
Sweet Home saga left property rights
advocates and environmentalists with a
vision of a never ending war in which
baffles would arise across the nation on
a regular basis. In fact, the Court had
taken a somewhat moderate position,
pulling back a bit from the Ninth Cir-
cuit's broad interpretation of "harm" in
Polila.i 45 In her concurring opinion, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that indirect harm
will trigger a violation of § 9 only if the
resulting harm is significant and the act is
a proximate cause of the harm, meaning
it results in actual or foreseeable injury or
death to a listed species. 148 In effect,
Justice O'Connor was saying that mere
habitat destruction would not be enough
for an illegal taking under § 9.
In a scathing and protracted dissent,
Justice Scalia argued that the majority's
position that the hunting and killing provi-
sion of the FWS regulation incidentally
preserves habitat on private lands im-
posed unfairness on land owners "to the
point of financial ruin." 4  In a three-
pronged attack, Scalia asserted that the
FWS regulation had defined "harm" in a
manner that failed to comport with the
purpose and scope of the ESA. First, he
claimed that the regulation wrongly inter-
preted the statute to prohibit habitat
modification that was merely the cause-
in-fact as opposed to the intended or
foreseeable cause of death or injury to
an endangered species. 14 Second, he
alleged the regulation is unlawful be-
cause it fails to require an act for a
"taking" to occur. Instead, the regula-
tion as modified in 1981 removed the
term "omission" based on the theory that
an act is inclusive of both omissions and
commissions."4 Scalia sided with the
petitioner, who had argued that for an
omission to constitute a wrongful act a
party must have a legal duty to act in the
first place. Scalia reserved his final
point for what he considered the most
unlawful feature of the regulation defin-
ing "injury." Scalia argued that the
FWS attached far too broad an interpre-
tation to "injury" by including significant
impairment of essential behavior pat-
terns, including breeding.' 50 Impairment
of breeding, Scalia stated, merely pre-
vents animals from propagating. It does
not injure living members of the species.
In closing dicta, Scalia argued that the
majority ruling was contrary to the intent
of the ESA, legislation which had been
carefully crafted to avoid holding individ-
ual landowners accountable for the cost
of preserving endangered species.' 5'
Despite Scalia's lengthy dissent, the
6-3 decision in Sweet Home 11 temporar-
ily settled the issue of whether the
Secretary of the Interior had taken the
takings provision too far.' 52  The core
problem, the need for more concrete
140 Id. at 2417-18.




" Comment, Recent Developments in Listings, supro note 5, at 91.
' Sweet Home II, 115 S.Ct. at 2418.
147 Id. at 242 1. Scalia further said the ruling unfairly would apply to not only the rich landowner but poor farmer "who finds his land conscripted to national
zoological use." Scalia was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Id.
148 Id.
i4 Id. at 2422.
150 Id
.s. Id. at 243 1. Scalia also took aim at the majority's four other main arguments. First, he criticized the majority opinion for as improperly assuming that
whatever furthers the ESA's primary objective must be upheld as law. Id. at 2426.
Second, he disagreed with the majority's claim that legislative history of the 1973 Act supports the Secretary's definition of a taking, arguing that legisla-
tors made clear distinctions between takings and habitat modification. Id. at 2426-27.
Third, Scalia stated that the 1982 amendments to the Act do not support a reading of the Act that calls for a prohibition on indirect as well as deliberate
takings. Id. at 2428.
Lastly, he argued that the majority, in dismissing Sweet Home's facial challenge, confused lawful application of the FWS regulation with application of a
non-existent regulation that would require various elements of liability absent from the actual regulation. Scalia argued that the majority took this approach to
circumvent the shortcomings in the regulation which fail to address the element of foreseeability of harm that the ESA takings provision requires. Id. at 2429.
MLR 209
Vol. 3 * No. 4
definitions within the ESA itself, could not
be solved by the Court.
III. POST-SWEET HOME COURTS
FURTHER DEFINE SCOPE OF "TAKINGS"
Although environmentalists declared
victory with Sweet Home, the debate
over the proper scope of "harm" and the
takings provision has continued to spill
into the courts. Since the June 1995 rul-
ing, courts have put their own twist on
Sweet Home's interpretation in an ongo-
ing effort to define what constitutes a
"taking" under the ESA and its support-
ing cost of regulations.
Less than a month after Sweet Home
was decided, two new cases drew the
Ninth Circuit back into the debate. Al-
though the first case did not directly in-
volve the "takings" provision, the court
addressed the closely-related issue of
whether property owners adversely af-
fected by government action had stand-
ing to sue under the ESA's citizen-suit
provision.i' In Bennett v. Plenert, Ore-
gon ranchers and irrigation districts,
motivated by profit and recreational
boating, wanted to maintain a reservoir
at higher levels than that decided upon
by the federal government.'55 The
government had conducted a study
which showed that the lake's level
needed to be lower to protect the Lost
River and shortnose suckers, both endan-
gered species.155
The ranchers filed a claim for de-
claratory and injunctive relief under the
citizens-suit provision of the ESA, alleg-
ing that the government was violating the
ESA by obfuscating the consultation re-
quirements' 56 and failing to consider the
economic impact of its decision to de-
clare the lake a "critical habitat"157 for
listed species. 158
In a ruling that bodes poorly for prop-
erty owners who want to have their
grievances considered within the context
of the ESA's takings provisions, the Ninth
Circuit held that the ranchers did not
have standing to sue under the citizens-
suit provision. 5 9  Referring to Sweet
Home and TVA, the Ninth Circuit held
that the citizen-suit provision was de-
signed solely to serve the goal of species
protection, not protection of private prop-
erty rights outside the "zone of interest"
of the ESA.'i TVA had stressed that the
term "interested persons" was used to
encourage citizens to be the eyes and
ears for the Secretary in the listing of en-
dangered and threatened species and to
bring suit in district court to force compli-
ance on behalf of those species.16' In
other words, if the northern spotted owl
or red-cockaded woodpecker was faced
with the threat of a "taking," the species
obviously could not file a petition for in-
junctive relief with the clerk of court. An
interested party, similar to a guardian ad
litem in child abuse cases, needed to
look out for the species' legal interests.
Like a guardian od litem, the interests the
party is protecting must be that of the ac-
tual victim of "harm" - under the ESA an
endangered or threatened species - not
the interests of the party itself.' 62 Noth-
ing in the ESA suggests the citizen-suit
provision should apply conversely to
property owners who suffer economic or
other hardship due to ESA prohibitions.
Applying the zone of interest test, the
Bennett court found that the plaintiffs had
no shared interest with the Lost River or
shortnose suckers. In fact, their recrea-
tional and economic interests were at
odds with the endangered fish.' 6 1
The court conceded that to comply
with the ESA, the government had to
consider a variety of factors, including
the economic impact on the community,
in deciding whether to designate the res-
ervoir as a critical habitatiM However,
112 Comment, Killers Conspire, supro note 41, at 865.
"' Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995).
1 s Id. at 916.
'ss Id.
1- 16 U.S.C. §§ 15361a) and 1533(b)(2).
1s7 As with the definition of "harm," the ESA left it up to the Departments of the Interior and Commerce to determine what constitutes a species' critical habitat.
See U.S.C. § 1533(bj(6)(C).
As with "harm" and the § 9 takings provision, the proper scope of the term "critical habitat" is a crucial element in the listing of a species as endangered
or threatened.
The ESA does define a "critical habitar' as a specific area worthy of protection because it contains physical and biological features necessary for survival
of a listed species. Id. As a result, critical habitats may include areas that the listed species is not occupying at the time and may exclude terrain that the spe-
cies can be found in but is not critical to its survival. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5)(AHC) 11994).
However, in addition to those guidelines, the ESA states the Departments of Interior and Commerce must take into account economic impact of designating
areas critical habitats and publish a regulation concerning the critical habitat along with the regulation concerning the listing of the species as endangered or
threatened. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b12).
'sa 63 F.3d at 916.
1s9 Id. at 92 1.
16 Id. at 919-20 (citing Sweet Home i, 115 S.Ct. at 2413 and TVA, 437 U.S. at 181).
161 437 U.S. at 181.
162 63 F.3d at 920. The court stated specifically: "[Gliven that the clear purpose of the ESA is to ensure the protection of endangered species, we conclude
that suits by plaintiffs who are interested only in avoiding the burdens of that preservation effort are more likely to frustrate than to further statutory objectives."
Id.
163 Id.
"' Id (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)).
210 ML
Taking Words for Granted
in a unanimous decision, the court held party receives authorization under § 7 not the ESA itself, settled the dispute.'7
that plaintiffs could not automatically ob- after consulting with the FWS.' The The FWS regulation states that the § 7
tain standing under the ESA by digging Sierra Club alleged that the B[M via- "takings" provision requiring renewed
up a potentially adverse effect on them lated §§ 7 and 9 by failing to consult consultations, kicks in only when a fed-
that the government failed to take into with the FWS concerning the effects the eral agency has retained control over the
account.'6 Three weeks after issuing road would have on the spotted owl and allegedly harmful action.'17 Referring to
the ruling in Bennett, the Ninth Circuit in its critical habitat.17 1 The BIM argued the analysis applied in Sweet Home, the
Sierra Club v. Babbitt'" faced another that the procedural requirements of the § Ninth Circuit stated that if the wording of
suit involving the proper scope of the 7 takings provision did not apply to any the ESA or an accompanying regulation
ESA "takings" clause. This time, the Si- agreements made before the ESA's pas- is ambiguous, then the court must defer
erra Club sought an injunction top halt sage in 1973." to the interpretation of the Department of
construction of a logging road on a Both parties agreed that a project the Interior." In this case, the Regional
right-of-way controlled by the Bureau of undertaken pursuant to the preexisting Solicitor for the Department had con-
Land Management (BLM), based on the agreement would trigger the § 7(a) tak- cluded that no further consultation by
potential adverse impact to the northern ings provision as long as the agreement BIM was necessary under the agreement
spotted owl.' 67 The question before the required the BIM to take additional ac- and, therefore, the agreement did not
court was whether an agreementi's be- tion after the ESA took effect which might run afoul of the § 7 taking provision.180
tween the logging industry and BLM, en- have an impact on the spotted owl.' The Ninth Circuit's ruling, once
tered into prior to the passage of the Although BLM was required to keep tabs again, highlighted the weakness inherent
ESA in 1973, violated the statute's tak- on the project, its only involvement was in the ESA; the need for ambiguous
ing provision in § 7.169 to advise the logging company that the terms and omissions to be clearly de-
Under § 7(a)(2), the ESA requires chosen route would not be the most di- fined.'' The decision by the Court of
federal agencies to consult with the FWS rect one, might cause severe erosion, or Appeals to defer to the Secretary of the
before engaging in any action which would interfere with other BIM projects; Interior's interpretation of crucial ESA
may adversely affect a protected spe- nothing which directly related to protec- terms on a case-by-case basis left wide
cies. i7o The court's analysis inherently tion of the threatened spotted owl.' 76  open the debate over how far the ESA's
involved a reading of § 7 in light of a § Thus, the question became whether "takings" provisions should go. In cls-
9 taking, which is broader in scope be- BLM's continued involvement under the ing, however, the court made a crucial
cause it involves violations by any per- preexisting agreement constituted a distinction regarding the scope of the
son, not just the federal government. 171 "takings" of the owl under the ESA. two "takings" provisions, indicating the
In addition, a taking by any party, in- Once again, the court held that inter Sierra Club might have sought relief for
cluding the federal government, does not pretations by the Secretary of the Interior the spotted owl under the wrong sec-
constitute a violation under § 9 if that and language within FWS regulations, tion. 82  The court stated that the § 7
165 Id.
Ser 65 F.3d 1502 t9th Cir. 19951.
167 Id. The district court had enjoined further road construction until either the BIMA or sawmill company complied with the ESA's consultation requirements.
168 Id. at 1505. The initial agreement dated bock to 1962, when BLM granted the Wooley Logging company use of certain righiof-way. In 1991,
construcwion of the road in dispute began after Wooley assigned its rights under the agreement to another sawmill company.
169 Id. at 1507.
'- 16 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 4 02.14(a. If, as in Bennet, the case involves potential harm to endangered or threatened marine life, then the
federal agency musi consult with the NMFS. See 50 C.F.R. § 1h536bi3llAt.
171 Id.
172 65 F.3d at 1505 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536b)14)h. The purpose of the consultation procedure is to enable to the FWS and NMFS to determine if a




175 Id. 011508 aciting numerous cases including Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454-58 (9th Cir. 19881; O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,
680-81 (9th Cir. 1995); Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 715 list Cir. 19791.
17 Id. at 1508, n. 7.
177 Id. at 1509.
"8 Id. iciting 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.3 and 402.16w.
179 Id.
haea Id. at 1507.
"1 See supro notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
1c2 Id. at 1511.
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"takings," provision, which applied only
to federal agencies, exacted the high
burden of proof requiring agencies to
conserve listed species, to consult with
the FWS and to refrain from adversely
modifying critical habitats.' In com-
parison, the § 9 takings provision, which
applies to private parties as well as gov-
ernment agencies, requires parties to
avoid acts that are reasonably likely to
harm an endangered species and
merely encourages them to report viola-
tions. 184
Subsequent to Sweet Home, district
courts outside of the Ninth Circuit also
attempted to tackle the takings issue.
The first case, Loggerhead Turtle v.
County Council of Volusia County, Flor-
ida, arose out of a dispute over the ef-
fect night driving on Daytona Beach was
having on the endangered Loggerhead
sea turtle.' 85  Two residents sought an
injunction against the county under the
citizens suit provision of the ESA.' 86 The
plaintiffs alleged that local ordinances
allowing nighttime driving on the beach
were posing immediate harm to and re-
sulted in an illegal "taking" of the sea
turtles.187  In Florida, the official sea turtle
nesting season lasts from May 1 st
through October 3 1st.188  During that
period, sea turtles dig cavities under the
sand where they lay their eggs. Once
the hatchlings break free from their
shells, they will perish within minutes un-
less they reach the sea.' 89 The district
court noted that artificial lighting from
cars, streets and homes can cause sea
turtle hatchlings to become disoriented
and crawl inland instead of out to sea.
In addition, the mother turtles often abort
nesting attempts because of the artificial
lighting.'19
Despite the fact that the Loggerhead
sea turtle is known to inhabit the Atlantic
Ocean off the coast of Florida, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service did not include
the forty-mile stretch of beach along Volu-
sia County as a "critical habitat" for the
turtles. County officials relied on the ex-
clusion to argue that, even if the local
ordinances were detrimental to the tur-
tle's environment, there was no "taking"
under § 9 of the ESA. The court disa-
greed, holding that a showing by the
plaintiffs that it was reasonably likely the
county's actions would result in future
"harm" to the endangered turtles would
create an irrebuttable presumption that
the threatened harm would be irreversi-
ble and, therefore, must be stopped.' 9'
The plaintiffs met that burden by showing
that lights from cars had caused the
hatchlings to be disoriented and that
cars also had crushed the emerging
hatchlings in the sand.'92 In short, the
court held that the issue of whether the
beaches in question were "critical habi-
tats" was irrelevant to the issue of
whether a "taking" had occurred under
§ 9;i9' one death of the endangered
Loggerhead was enough to trigger an
illegal "takin 9
Relying on the Supreme Court's
analysis in Sweet Home, Judge Conway
added that it was not within the court's
purview to balance the economic inter-
ests of Volusia County against the social
value of protecting the turtles.' 95 Volusia
County claimed Justice Stevens' dicta at
the end of Sweet Home required courts
to conduct a case-by-case analysis of
such interests in determining whether an
illegal taking had occurred.' 9 6 The dis-
trict court read Sweet Home more nar-
rowly. Judge Conway stated that Sweet
Home stood for the proposition that the'
ESA gave the Interior Secretary, not the
courts, the power to balance those fac-
tors when issuing regulations and taking
permits.' 97 Repeating Stevens' dicta, the
district court stated that complex policy
decisions such as how to define "harm"
under the ESA are best left to the Secre-
tary of the Interior.' 98
By finding that direct injury had be-
fallen the sea turtles and by narrowly in-
terpreting Justice Steven's words, the
Florida district court avoided the problem
of having to define "harm." Instead, it
left that burden where the ESA had
placed it by default, in the lap of the
Secretary of the Interior. The exact defi-
nition of what constituted a "taking" un-
der § 9 of the ESA has proven to be an
elusive animal.
13 Id. at 1511 Iciting 16 U.S.C. § 1536).
' Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538 and 1540(g)).
"Ss Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 896 F.Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
186 Id. at 1170.
187 The county, with permission of the state, had allowed people to drive their cars on the beach itself an hour before sunrise until one hour after sunset, with
restricted hours during sea turtle nesting season. In addition, cars were allowed to park on the beaches until midnight, and issued special permits to fisherman
to drive on the beach after dark. Id. at 1174; Fla.Stat.Ann. § 161.58 (West 1990).
I'l Id. at 1172.
189 Id.
i9 Id. at I1]73-74.
191 Id. at 1180.
1'2 Id. at 118 T-8 2.
'9 Id. at 1180.
'4 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 4-5 (1973); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1973, p. 2989).
'9 Id. at 1180.
'9 Id. at 1179.
'9 Id. at 1179-80.
'" Id.at 1180.
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V. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION:
TAKING THE AMBIGUITY OUT OF
TAKINGS
For years, the property rights move-
ment has combined political pressure
with often-inflated claims of economic
devastation to word off the ESA's protec-
tion of endangered species." In recent
years, however, property owners have
increasingly looked to the legal system
for relief, filing lawsuits under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act2 to stall new
listings under the ESA. More impor-
tantly, they have alleged Fifth Amend-
ment violations, arguing that the listing of
endangered species under the ESA con-
stitutes a "taking" of their property; an
argument that is only possible because
of the ambiguous nature of the ESA's
"takings" provision.201 To date, their
attempts largely have been unsuccessful.
As long as the § 9 "takings" provision
remains in its present form, however, the
property rights movement will push the
ESA's ambiguity to the limit.202
In 1992, for example, a property
owner in the Supreme Court case of Lu-
cas v. South Carolina successfully ar-
gued that a zoning law which barred
him from building a house on adjoining
beach parcels, but did not compensate
him for his loss, constituted a "taking" in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.203
Distinguishing between real and
personal property, Justice Scalia stated
that the government traditionally has ex-
ercised a much higher degree of control
over personal property. But when it
comes to land - the property most often
at issue in ESA takings - Scalia said the
government cannot apply the same
"police power" mentality:
[t]he notion.. that title is some-
how held subject to the 'implied
limitation' that the State may
subsequently eliminate all eco-
nomically valuable use is incon-
sistent with the historical
compact recorded in the Tak-
ings Clause that has become
part of our constitutional
culture.'04
The Court noted, however, that the
"total taking" standard requires an analy-
sis of the degree of harm a property
owner's actions pose to public lands
and resources. 205 Add to the analysis
the fact that property owners rarely face
total economic loss due to the ESA and
the "total taking" standard is one most
landowners still cannot meet.2" Scalia's
opinion did not change the Court's pre-
vious interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment takings clause. However, his
strong language did give credence to
the property owners' contention that the
ESA "takings" provision, under appropri-
ate circumstances, could infringe on their
5th Amendment rights.
Two years later, in Dolon v. Tigard,
Justice Rehnquist advanced the property
owners' argument by adopting a more
stringent test for determining whether
government regulations amount to an un-
constitutional taking of land.207 In Do-
/on, the city of Portland, Oregon, agreed
to grant a building permit to the owner
of a plumbing store on the condition that
she donate part of her property to the
city for drainage improvements and a
bicycle path.208 Writing for a 5-4 plural-
ity, Rehnquist held that the city failed to
show its actions were "roughly propor-
tional" to its goal of land use plan-
ning. 2' Although Rehnquist stated that
"no precise mathematical equation is
required,,210 the new rough proportion-
ality test requires the government to show
that the scope of a regulation is related
in both the "nature and extent" to the
impact of the land development. 21' If
the government fails to meet that burden,
it must pay the landowner for the value
of the lost property or allow the owner to
go ahead with the proposed land
use.212  With the Dolan decision, the
court moved one step closer to attacking
the broad interpretation of the ESA's tak-
ings provisions. As one commentator
has stated, Dolan has the potential of
creating a litany of environmental litiga-
tion designed to make the public pay
potential polluters, developers and prop-
erty owners not to develop their land.213
" Comment, Opponent Thwart Protection, supro note 22, 586-87 (citing Michelle Desiderio, The ESA: Facing Hard Truths and Advocating Responsible
Reform, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 37 (1993)).
2o 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); See also, Comment, Opponents Thwart Protection, supro note 22, at 586-87.
20' One commentator states that environmentalists have also seized on the ambiguity within the ESA to stall land development by finding a species that is listed
or has the potential of being listed. See John Charles Kunich, The Endangered Species Act at 21: Issue of Reauthorization Species & Habitat Conservation,24 ENvrt. L. 501, 568 (1994) [hereinafter Comment, The ESA at 21].
202 Id. at 568 ("the fogginess of standards allows for lax and ineffective implementation of the ESA if the Administration is disinclined to be aggressive in its
conversation efforts.")
2' Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2' Id. at 1028.
205 Id. at 1030.
2 Comment, Killers Conspire, supra note 42, at 871 (citing tucos, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7). This standard is similar to the "whole parcel" rule established
by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
207 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
208 Id. at 2313-14.
2 Id. at 2319.
210 Id. at 2321.
211 Id. at 2319-20.
212 Id.
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The only remaining barrier property
owners must overcome to win the ESA-
Fifth Amendment takings war in the
courts is the prevailing rule in Sweet
Home, that complex policy decisions
involved in defining ambiguous terms
such as "harm" and "harass" should be
left to the Secretary of the Interior. 214
Meanwhile, buoyed by Lucas and Do-
lan, property rights advocates continue
to chip away at the vague parameters of
the ESA's "takings" provisions in an at-
tempt to weaken its effectiveness. The
logging industry and other landowners
have lobbied legislators to pass new
laws that would compensate them when
ESA prohibitions result in decreased
property values.215 Early last year, law-
makers passed H.R. 925, which requires
the government to reimburse landowners
when any action taken pursuant to the
ESA and the Wetlands Act impairs the
value of their land by more than twenty
percent.2 16  A host of other recently
passes Congressional bills call for a
moratorium on adding new species to
the endangered list until the ESA is reau-
thorized.217 Only a few of the proposals
introduced would actually strengthen the
ESA.21s
A recent indication of the shaky politi-
cal ground on which the ESA's "takings"
provision now stands is Senate Bill
768.219 Introduced in May of 1995 by
Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wa.), the bill
would limit the definition of "harm" to
direct acts that kill or injure individual
members of an endangered or threat-
ened species.220 The Gorton Bill reels in
the FWS's definition of "harm," allowing
property owners to destroy or degrade
habitats of listed species as long as their
actions do not directly result in the death
or injury of those species.221  A few
months after Gorton came out with his
bill, three congressman proposed H.R.
2275.222 The companion bill also limits
the definition of "harm" to direct acts that
result in injury or death.223
As the 1996 elections approach, the
ESA's "takings" provision will continue to
shift with the prevailing political climate.
The ESA's opponents are fighting the
"takings" war on two major fronts: in the
courts and in Congress. If the ESA's op-
ponents can pass amendments that
curtail the scope of key terms such as
"harm" and "harass," and compensate
property owners who suffer losses result-
ing from enforcement of the ESA, they
will have succeeded in severely weaken-
ing the Act.224
When Congress amends the ESA,
and in particular the "takings" provisions
under §§ 7 and 9, it needs to adhere to
the stated purpose of the Act. The ESA
was enacted in 1973 to:
[p]rovide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endan-
gered species and threatened
species depend may be con-
served, to provide a program
for the conservation of such en-
dangered species and threat-
ened species, and to take such
steps as may be appropriate to
achieve the purposes of the
treaties and conventions set forth
in [the Act].225
Numerous legislators, scholars and
commentators have come up with intri-
cate, often unrealistic remedies for
"fixing" the ESA before its reauthoriza-
tion.226 For example, one commentator
213 Comment, Opponents Thwart Protection, supro note 22, at 593.
214 See supro note 144 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., Debate, Taking "Takings" Seriously, supro note 1, at 267-70.
216 Id.
217 See, e.g., S. 191, H.R. 490 and H.R. 571, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (11995); S. 2451, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess (1994).
21 For example, S. 921, introduced in 1993, places the emphasis on ecosystem conservation instead of species-based preservation. The bill also
encourages private land owners to preserve species by creating incentives and new permitting programs. Landowners who take early action to preserve
species would be awarded with federal land planning assistance.
H.R. 2043, also takes an ecosystem approach by calling for wildlife that would aid in the recovery of endangered species to be added to the list as well.
The bill also would set aside $25 million for incentive programs that encourage landowners to preserve species. See also, Comment, The Reouthorizaon of
the ESA, supro note 16.
219 S. 768, 104th Cong., Ist. Sess. (11995).
220 Id.
223 Id.
222 H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. § 202 (1995). The bill was introduced by Billy Tauzin (D-ta.), John Doolittle (R-Calif.) and Richard Pombo (R-Colif.).
2 Id. In 1993, Tauzin had introduced H.R. 1490, which calls for compensating private property owners who lose substantial value in their land due to the
takings provision in § 7 of the ESA or denial of a § 10 incidental takings permit. H.R. 1490, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1994). In 1994, Doolittle had
introduced H.R. 3997, which required the agency that listed a species as endangered to compensate the effected property owner and caled for a three-part
economic impact analysis before a federal agency could implement a species recovery plan. H.R. 3997, 103d Cong., 2d Sess- § 2 (19941-
221 Charles Tiefer, former Deputy General Counsel of the House of Representatives from 1984 to 1995, and Solicitor for the House of Representatives from
1993 to 1995, recently called much of the anti-ESA legislation "The Sham Takings Bill(s)." Tiefer points out that while the bills fail to earmark billions of dollar&
that would be needed to compensate all landowners affected economically by the ESA. See Debate, Taking "Takings" Seriously, supro note 1, at 273.
22s 16 U.S.C. s. 153 1(b) (1988).
22 See, e.g., William Snape, III & Heather Weiner, Recipe For Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act, 5 DuKE Evrwr. L. & Pot'Y F. 61 (calling for a
National Commission on Species Extinction, Proactive measures such as computer mapping of species, greater state involvement, regional planning to achieve
ecosystem management); Comment, Endangered Species At 21, supro note 201, at 571-8 (suggesting an ecosystem approach, intensive scientific research
about the extinction and evolution, conservation incentives, tax breaks for "ecosystem enterprise zones," subsidized controlled raising, just compensation,
special allowances and exemptions, Adopt-a-Species programs, fostering of Eco-tourism, and private ownership of listed species.)
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suggests that the government start an
Adopt-a-Species program that would
give groups money and recognition for
helping preserve species and an Eco-
tourism plan to encourage support for the
environment and wildlife.227 While such
proposals may be nice ideas, they fail to
bridge the philosophical gap between
environmentalists and the property rights
movement. Congress and others in the
midst of the debate need to come to
terms with the fact that this chasm be-
tween the two groups will remain as
wide and exist as long as the Grand
Canyon. Incentive programs for devel-
opers will never cause them to abandon
an opportunity to make a million dollars
off their land. Similarly, gathering better
scientific data on species will never con-
vince environmentalists that the govern-
ment is doing enough to protect wildlife.
The values behind the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause will always conflict with
those behind the ESA's "takings"
provisions.
Congress can resolve a major part of
the debate, however, by clearing up am-
biguous language that has survived in
the ESA's takings provisions since its in-
ception twenty-three years ago. The ESA
is enormously powerful. The federal gov-
ernment can wield this power to disable
major developments and local econo-
mies. Yet the ESA "contains no clear,
objectively verifiable criteria to govern
when it should and should not be ap-
plied." 228  The vagueness within the
"takings" provisions in particular has
encouraged the property rights move-
ment to argue that the § 9 prohibitions
against development and other discre-
tionary uses of private property constitute
a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment.22 9
When Congress reauthorizes the ESA, it
must keep in mind that the Constitution
does not confer an ultimate, unfettered
right on property owners to do whatever
they wish on their land. It has been long
established that property owners in the
United States hold their land under the
"implied obligation" that they use it with-
out injury to the community.230
So far, the U.S. Supreme Court has
rightly refused to take on the task of de-
fining terms within the ESA. The Court in
Sweet Home, for example, only decided
whether definitions in FWS regulations
exceed the scope of the ESA and
whether the task of interpreting the ESA
should have been vested in the FWS in
the first place. 23' The Court added to
the present conflict, however, by making
the specious argument that the task of
defining the scope of "takings" was best
left to the Secretary of the Interior be-
cause it involved complex policy matters.
Courts routinely decide issues based on
policy considerations and the political
climate of the day. Justice Stevens said
that when Congress entrusted the Secre-
tary of the Interior with the job of defin-
ing "harm" to endangered species, the
Court was reluctant to second guess the
Secretary's definitions. This does
not, however, preclude Congress from
defining more clearly the meaning of
"takings" and other underlying definitions
such as "harass" and "pursue". Above
all, Congress must keep in mind the
ESA's broad, overarching purpose of
protecting endangered and threatened
species, as well as safeguarding the
habitats and ecosystems in which they
exist.
221 Id. The Adopt-A-Species idea is based on the Adopt-A-Highway program. Ironically, many of the battles between the timber industry and
environmentalists involve logging roads that cut through critical habitats of endangered and threatened species.
228 Comment, The Endangered Species Act, supro note 201, at 21, at 567.
229 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 896 F.Supp. 1057 (D. Colo. 1995), where the plaintiff attempted to sell the artifacts of several endangered species,including the black rhinoceros, tiger, clouded leopard and snow leopard, which his father had given him 15 years earlier. Hill moved to dismiss criminal
sanctions filed against him under the ESA, arguing that several terms in the Act were nebulous and gave the Secretary of the Interior too much discretion in
determining what "in danger of extinction" meant. The court disagreed, holding that the taskof defining endangered and threatened species requires expertise
outside the province of Congress and thus was property left in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior. Applying the analysis in Sweet Home, the court looked
in the dictionary to define "danger" as the state of being exposed to harm. Interestingly, neither the court nor the plaintiff addressed the issue of whether the
FWS regulations had defined "harm" too broadly. Id. at 1061.
The court held that government action under the ESA which resulted in a reduction in the value of Hill's artifacts did not rise to the level of a "taking" under
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1062.
220 See, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-9 (1 887)(held that prohibitions against uses injurious to the health, morals and safety of the community do
not violate the Takings Clause.)
231 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2417 (1995).
232 Id.
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